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Emergence that Matters and Emergent
Irrelevance
On the Political Use of Fundamental Physics
CHRISTOPH F. E. HOLZHEY
Physics was long considered as the model science. It arguably lost
this role to the life sciences towards the end of the twentieth century,
but some strands of new materialism have helped to give it a second
wind. How physics theorizes matter seems to matter again, and not
only intellectually but politically as well. As an ex-physicist who is
semi-converted to the humanities, I am quite interested in the idea
of mobilizing the critical potential of physics, but for this very reason
I find it important to problematize some of the ways in which this
potential tends to be all too quickly either embraced or rejected.
In this chapter, I will need to be quite quick and schematic myself
and will only give some indications and elaborations on three points.
They are, firstly, my claim that the fundamental ontology of matter
has no political relevance; secondly, my position that what is politic-
ally relevant is, instead, to devise effective strategies to deactivate the
normative power of fundamental ontologies; and thirdly, the prop-
osition that physics can be helpful to address these first two points,
that is, to understand its own irrelevance and at the same time inspire
strategies to deactivate the normativity of ontologies of matter.
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1. THE FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY OF MATTER IS (POLITICALLY)
IRRELEVANT
Let me begin with some clarifications of my claim. I speak of the ‘fun-
damental ontology ofmatter’ and take it primarily in the sense that one
might associate with physics, that is, in terms of defining elementary
material constituents and establishing their laws of interaction, orwhat
is often referred to as the ‘theory of everything’.1 This is what I will
primarily mean by the term ‘ontology’ even when I do not qualify it
further; I do not thereby intend to subsume or exclude other dimen-
sions ormeanings of ontology, in particular not a ‘materialist ontology’,
which I would consider to have a far broader meaning.
By claiming that the ontology of matter has no relevance, I mean
that no difference could be detected on our human scale — or indeed
any finite length scale — if the fundamental ontology were quite rad-
ically different. I am thinking of alternatives such as discrete particles
moving in a vacuumvs a continuumconception ofmatter; or processes
fully determined by laws of motion (which is associated withmechan-
ics) vs allowing for random deviations or something like free will.
My claim, then, is that any of these ontological options are com-
patible with all that could possiblymatter on any specified scale.When
it is understood in this way my claim could seem unsurprising. Who
would have thought that the ontologies of matter proposed by physics
are politically relevant? Wouldn’t that imply, among other things, an
archaic appeal to nature, falling prey to the naturalistic fallacy of de-
1 See, e.g., the glossary of Brian Greene, The Elegant Universe: Superstrings, Hidden
Dimensions, and the Quest for the Ultimate Theory (New York: Vintage Books, 2000):
‘T.O.E. (Theory of Everything). A quantum-mechanical theory that encompasses all
forces and all matter’ (p. 423). The term became popular in the 1980s in the context
of string theory as a promising candidate to address the fundamental incompatibility
of highly successful fundamental theories such as quantummechanics and gravitation.
While it seems uncontroversial within physics that a ‘theory of everything’ in this sense
of describing all matter and interactions should be possible, even Greene remarks that
there is no agreement on further associations with this ‘grandiose descriptive term’
(p. 16): for a ‘staunch reductionist’, such a theory would truly describe everything and
effectively represent the endof physics, while others, himself included,would highlight
that reduction in principle does not imply reduction in practice; they would consider
a T.O.E. as but the beginning, namely as ‘the firmest foundation on which to build
our understanding’ (p. 17). Others, still, some of whom I will cite in section three,
insist that ‘unexpected phenomena’ and ‘new physical principles’ and ‘independent
laws’ would emerge at larger scales (p. 17).
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riving an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’? Isn’t it uncontroversial that physics only
describes but cannot establish political or ethical norms?
Yet, much of what is written under the label of new materialism
argues for the political importance of ontology in the sense I outlined
earlier. Their proponents tend to agree on insisting that matter is fun-
damentally active, agential, vibrant, even vital. In this way, they seek to
correct what they interpret as the still-dominant ontology ofDescartes
and its solidification through Newton’s mechanics, which through its
success established the paradigm for all modern scientific knowledge.
Thisontology is dualistic, conceivingmatter as passive and inert, and as
animated and activated by human subjects—be it directly or in amore
complex cultural and linguistic way.2 In like manner, the tradition of
historical materialism also gets targeted as presupposing the passivity
of matter.3
Why is it so important for new materialism to overcome this
ontology by insisting on the activity of matter? In what sense is it
political? To put it very briefly and roughly, the argument is that the
dualism of active subject vs passive matter lies at the heart of a host
of hierarchical binaries in which one side masters and dominates the
other, which has led to the violence of sexism, classism, racism, and
the exploitation of nature.
This understanding of the political and its criteria are certainly not
new: there is a long tradition of tracing fundamental, political issues
to the persistence of hierarchical binaries, and of adopting different
positions and strategies in response that seek to overcome the violent
consequencesof thesebinaries.Most feminist traditions couldbemen-
tioned here, especially ecofeminism, as well as queer theory with its
2 See, e.g., StacyAlaimo and SusanHekman, ‘Introduction: EmergingModels ofMateri-
ality in FeministTheory’, in their co-editedMaterial Feminisms (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2008), pp. 1–19; Diana Coole and Samantha Frost, ‘Introducing
the New Materialisms’, in New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics, ed. by
Diana Coole and Samantha Frost (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), pp.
1–43; Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 2010).
3 See, e.g., SamanthaFrost, ‘The Implications of theNewMaterialisms for Feminist Epis-
temology’, in Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, ed. by Heidi E. Grass-
wick (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2011), pp. 69–83 and Simon Choat, ‘Science,
Agency and Ontology: A Historical-Materialist Response to New Materialism’, Polit-
ical Studies, 66.4 (2018), 1027–42 <https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321717731926>.
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critique of heteronormativity. To use an intellectual shortcut, one can
say that what unites otherwise quite diverse positions and problem-
atizes the naturalistic-fallacy argument is the notion of performativity,
which undermines the systematic separation of registers: no descrip-
tion or representation ofwhat is is ever neutral. Instead, it is always also
performative, productive, and normative.
2. THE RELEVANCE OF DEACTIVATING THE NORMATIVE POWER
OF FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGIES
While I agree that it is important to acknowledge the performative
power of ontology, I also think it is important to distinguish different
political strategies relating to it. I am thinking, in particular, of different
feminist and queer strategies that oppose gender essentialism, that
is to say, the dispositive that turns nature into destiny. One primary
and influential strategy in these traditions is to distinguish between
biological sex and socially constructed gender, and to insist that the
norms and categories of gender are contingent and do not result from
biology.This strategy could also be described as insisting on a break or
cut between ontology and politics, or between what is and what could
be— and arguably ought to be—otherwise, and it seems very similar
to what I am proposing.
However, there is also the important counter-argument that such a
division only serves to veil the social construction of sexual difference
and its function of founding and stabilizing a hierarchical gender bin-
ary. According to this view — and I am thinking especially of Judith
Butler’s Gender Trouble and her theory of gender performativity —
all reference to a pre-discursive ontology is politically suspect. This
position abolishes the distinctions between sex and gender, ontology
andpolitics, and the descriptive and the normative,4 and replaces them
with a continuity. As Butler writes in reference toMoniqueWittig: ‘sex
proves to have been gender from the start’.5 In other words, ontology
is always already politics; ‘Ontology is, thus, not a foundation, but a
4 Cf. Butler’s reflection on the temptation to distinguish between a descriptive and a
normative account of gender in her 1999 preface to Gender Trouble: Feminism and the
Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1999), p. xxi.
5 Ibid., p. 189.
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normative injunction that operates insidiously by installing itself into
political discourse as its necessary ground’.6
In many circles, this kind of argument has made it quasi-taboo to
invoke ontology, ‘nature’, ‘being’, etc., at least without using inverted
commas. And this development is precisely what new materialisms
have reacted to. In my reading, these various thinkers share the in-
tuition that refraining from ontological references may only disavow
an ontology of inert, passive matter and unwittingly re-enforce it.7
They insist on taking matter more seriously and engaging in onto-
logical speculations, asking such questions as, for example, ‘What if
Culture Was Really Nature All Along?’.8 Of course, with this reversal
of Butler’s ‘sex has been gender from the start’, the question becomes
how anything can be said or thought about matter without employing
discourse. The new materialist move could perhaps be described as
follows: Firstly, to highlight the importance of implicit ontological as-
sumptions— in particular, of the opposition between active discourse
and passive matter — and the difficulty of avoiding them.9 Secondly,
to engage with and rework ontology, rather than disavowing it, and
thereby seek to improve its politics.
It should be noted that a great deal of thework produced under the
banner of theontological turn—initiated through relatedbut different
traditions, especially in science studies and anthropology — is not
interested in asserting an ontology that would lie beyond cultural or
linguistic construction. Instead, the aim in such work generally seems
to be a radicalization of the constructivist impulse and a deflation of
6 Ibid.
7 The mechanism of disavowal that I am invoking here is modelled upon Sigmund
Freud’s account of fetishism as a disavowal of sexual difference, which involves both
a denial of the ‘reality’ of castration and its acknowledgment through anxiety and
the defensive creation of fetishes. Disavowal here produces precisely what it was
supposed to avert, namely a split (and in that sense castrated) subject. See the entry
‘Disavowal’ in Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, The Language of Psycho-
Analysis (London: Hogarth Press, 1973), pp. 118–21. From a feminist perspective, a
fetishization of women is just as problematic as their identification with an essential
lack.
8 Vicki Kirby, ‘Natural Convers(at)ions: Or, What If Culture Was Really Nature All
Along?’, in Material Feminisms, ed. by Alaimo and Hekman, pp. 214–36.
9 Indeed, one might consider it impossible to avoid ontological assumptions, though
I wonder whether such a claim would have to be based in pragmatics, anthropology,
psychology, or aesthetics rather than logic.
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the normative effect of ontology. This is to be achieved through the
identification of a multiplicity of different — that is to say, incompat-
ible but individually equally viable — ontologies, and not merely in
philosophical or spiritual belief systems but also in social practices.10
I find this strategy promising, and while what I will propose re-
sembles it, I also want to note that it is highly ambiguous. Indeed,
proliferating ontological discourses rather than renouncing them in-
creases the risk of unwittingly re-enforcing ontological assumptions
through disavowal:11 In particular, the view that all ontologies are con-
structed and mediated by discourse seems to fit well with an ontology
of passivematter and active discourse.This is not to say that a pluraliza-
tion of ‘ontologies’— and what has been called ‘ontological politics’12
— necessarily implies such an underlying ontology of matter and dis-
course, but its redefinition of ontology forecloses the possibility of
critically addressing the effect of underlying ontologies — something
that was still possible within the strategy of refraining from positive
ontological references.13
10 Cf. Steve Woolgar and Javier Lezaun, ‘The Wrong Bin Bag: A Turn to Ontology in
Science and Technology Studies?’, Social Studies of Science, 43.3 (2013), pp. 321–
40 <https://doi.org/10.1177/0306312713488820>; Martin Holbraad, Morten Axel
Pedersen, and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, ‘The Politics of Ontology: Anthropo-
logical Positions’, 2014 <https://culanth.org/fieldsights/the-politics-of-ontology-
anthropological-positions> [accessed 26 March 2019]; Christopher Gad, Casper
Bruun Jensen, and Brit Ross Winthereik, ‘Practical Ontology: Worlds in STS and
Anthropology’, NatureCulture, 3 (2015), pp. 67–86.
11 Cf. Woolgar and Lezaun’s worry that the notion of ‘ontological politics’ may ‘entail
commitments that take us beyond the long established deflationary stances of sceptical
STS’ (p. 336).
12 Cf. Annemarie Mol, ‘Ontological Politics. A Word and Some Questions’, The Socio-
logical Review, 47.1_suppl (1999), pp. 74–89 <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
954X.1999.tb03483.x>, referring to John Law.
13 See, e.g., Astrid Deuber-Mankowsky, ‘Das ontologische Debakel oder was heißt: Es
gibt Medien?’, ZMK Zeitschrift Medien- und Kulturforschung, 8.2 (2017), pp. 157–68,
who observes critically that computer-science discourses of ‘operational ontologies’
avoid and disavow the philosophical question of ontology—what is being?—with the
effect that everything, including human beings, is objectified and treated as given data
and ‘stock’ (Bestand). Giorgio Agamben’s bookWhat Is Real? (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2018) is animated by a similar worry, namely that abandoning the
properly philosophical question of being means forsaking valuable resources for res-
isting (neo‐)liberal, biopolitical modes of governmentality. But these two thinkers do
not employ similar strategies to counter a pluralization of ontologies. While Agamben
pushes towards amore properly ontological inquiry, I interpret Deuber-Mankowsky as
following the strategy of ‘refraining from ontological references’ in order to keep the
question of ontology open.
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By contrast, the new materialist positions that I focus upon target
the ontological level underlying discursive practices. Instead of being
interested in deflating ontologies by multiplying them, they propose
an alternative ontology: one that conceives of matter as active, vibrant,
and even alive, rather than as passive, inert, and dualistically opposed
to the activity and agency of human discourse and culture. I am es-
pecially interested in the influential argument by Karen Barad, who
mobilizes theoretical physics to develop what she calls an ‘agential
realist ontology’.14
AlthoughBarad criticizes the excessive power granted to language,
she takes no issue with the notion of performativity that, according
to Butler, accounts for that power. On the contrary, she extends per-
formativity from language tomatter itself. Her neologism ‘intra-action’
encapsulates much of her argument: this term goes beyond the ‘usual
“interaction,” which presumes the prior existence of independent en-
tities/relata’,15 and instead allows for the emergence of separate entities.
According to Butler, the fact ‘[t]hat the gendered body is performative
suggests that it has no ontological status apart from the various acts
which constitute its reality’.16 While one might limit this argument
to manifestly social categories such as gender, Barad emphasizes than
in quantum mechanics the ontological status of elementary entities,
such as light or electrons, depends on how their reality is constituted
in experimental acts: for instance, depending on the apparatus with
which they are observed, they materialize as particles or waves.
The parallels Barad draws between discursive and quantum per-
formativity are striking, compelling, and suggestive. However, they
also run the risk of short-circuiting different levels, registers, and
scales, thereby creating profound ambiguities and losing a sense of
what, in her own account, emerges and comes to matter in between.
On the one hand, expanding performativity extends what I would
characterize as top-down constructions, from social discourse all the
way down to the sub-atomic scale, while, on the other, it also ends
14 Karen Barad, ‘Posthumanist Performativity: Toward anUnderstanding of HowMatter
Comes to Matter’, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 28.3 (2003), pp.
801–31 (p. 811).
15 Barad, ‘Posthumanist Performativity’, p. 815, emphasis added.
16 Butler, Gender Trouble, p. 173.
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up flipping to its reverse: Rather than refraining from ontological dis-
course Barad often affirms a particular ontology. Asserting a ‘relational
ontology’, insisting on ‘nature’s queerness’, and affirming an ontol-
ogy of ‘indeterminacy’, as she does, certainly avoids many problem
associated with essentialism and helps to counteract them.17 Still, I
would maintain that any ontology, however indeterminate, relational,
or processual, becomes problematically normative when one forgets
its speculative, constructed, and strategic character and instead just
embraces its performativity, which is seen as operating across all scales
from the bottom-up, as it were. Among other things that I cannot
unfold here,18 there is the risk that such an ontology would become
unduly extrapolated to suggest that everything is indeterminate and
queer, and should and can be recognized and destabilized as such.19
Indeed, Barad insists quite emphatically that her account holds for
all scales, from the microscopic to the macroscopic and in a precise
and literal — rather than merely analogical way — for discourses as
much as for matter.20 According to my reading, this claim ends up
17 Barad, ‘Posthumanist Performativity’, pp. 812, 816 and Karen Barad, ‘Nature’s Queer
Performativity’,Qui Parle: Literature, Philosophy, Visual Arts, History, 19.2 (2011), pp.
121–58 (pp. 125, 147).
18 See e.g. the contributions by Cornelia Möser and Marianna Poyares in this volume.
19 Such questions of (post)foundationalism in new feminist materialisms are addressed
by Katharina Hoppe, ‘Eine neue Ontologie des Materiellen? Probleme und Perspekt-
iven neomaterialistischer Feminismen’, inMaterial turn: Feministische Perspektiven auf
Materialität und Materialismus, ed. by Christine Löw and others (Leverkusen: Bar-
bara Budrich, 2017). While Hoppe suggests that a ‘relational ontology’ like Barad’s
can escape the problem of a normative essentialism, Timothy Morton and Graham
Harman warn against over-investing in the political benefits of relational ontologies.
See Timothy Morton, ‘Treating Objects Like Women: Feminist Ontology and the
Question of Essence’, in International Perspectives in Feminist Ecocriticism, ed. by Greta
Gaard, Simon C. Estok, and Serpil Oppermann (New York: Routledge, 2013), pp.
56–69. Heeding this warning does not imply endorsing Harman’s ‘speculative realist’
alternative, his ‘Object Oriented Ontology’ (OOO). Rather, I find its critique by
Thomas Lemke not only compelling, but — for very similar reasons — also applicable
to Barad’s Agential Realism, including his argument that ‘OOO’s promise to break
once and for all with subject–object dualism results in a revived form of subjectivism’.
See Thomas Lemke, ‘Materialism without Matter: The Recurrence of Subjectivism in
Object-OrientedOntology’,Distinktion: Journal of SocialTheory, 18.2 (2017), pp. 133–
52 (p. 134) <https://doi.org/10.1080/1600910X.2017.1373686>. In other words,
while I argue for the strategic value of speculative ontologies, I also see a need for a
critical corrective to their proclaimed realism.
20 Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of
Matter and Meaning (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), pp. 24, 86, 110;
‘Nature’s Queer Performativity’, p. 147. See also Elizabeth Stephens, ‘Feminism and
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undermining her own sense of ‘how matter comes to matter’, which
requires emergent discontinuities or what she calls ‘agential cuts’ en-
acted through intra-action.21
I agree that the notion of emergence is key for understanding
how matter comes to matter, and also that a cut or discontinuity is
important.However, the crucial question is how to relate discontinuity
to the notion of emergence, which has gainedmuch currency in recent
years but still remains thoroughly ambiguous.22 Indeed, thenotionof a
continuously emerging discontinuity seems inherently contradictory,
and requiring it as a condition for something coming to matter risks
implying that nothing can actually come to matter and everything is
already determined ‘from the start’ and ‘all along’, whether through
discourse or nature.
Instead, what I would like to suggest is that matter properly comes
to matter at any relevant scale to the extent that other scales cease
to matter. There is no need to claim any discontinuity here, only a
New Materialism: The Matter of Fluidity’, Interalia: A Journal of Queer Studies, 9
(2014), pp. 186–202. I should highlight that Barad’s point that quantum phenomena
are not necessarily restricted to microscopic scales is well taken if one takes ‘scale’
only in terms of length scales. Nevertheless, in most interpretations of quantum
mechanics (in particular Bohr’s), the possibility of describing experiment and its
results as classical (rather than quantum) objects is crucial and this requires a large
number of accessible degrees of freedom (as can usually be found in macroscopic
objects).
21 Cf. Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, esp. pp. 175–79. For a critique of Barad’s
denial of ‘scale variance’, see DerekWoods, ‘Scale Variance and the Concept ofMatter’,
inTheNew Politics of Materialism: History, Philosophy, Science, ed. by Sarah Ellenzweig
and John H. Zammito (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017), pp. 200–24. While I largely
agree with his critique, I am sceptical about his insistence of linking ‘scale variance’
to the emergence of ‘jumps and discontinuities’ (p. 201) across scales and maintain
that physics can only account for a pragmatic sense of emergence. For a helpful and
nuanced assessment of Barad’s agential realism, stressing the importance of emergent
discontinuities as well as exclusions, see Gregory Hollin and others, ‘(Dis)Entangling
Barad: Materialisms and Ethics’, Social Studies of Science, 47.6 (2017), pp. 918–41
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0306312717728344>.
22 For entry points into the vast literature on emergence as notion that appeared in late-
nineteenth biological and evolutionary theories and ‘re-emerged’ in the last quarter
of the twentieth century as a ‘legitimate’ and widely popularized scientific concept
in theories of complexity, self-organization, and chaos, see, for example, Peter A.
Corning, ‘The Re-Emergence of “Emergence”: A Venerable Concept in Search of a
Theory’, Complexity, 7.6 (2002), pp. 18–30 <https://doi.org/10.1002/cplx.10043>
and the very helpful reader Emergence: Contemporary Readings in Philosophy and
Science, ed. by Mark A. Bedau and Paul Humphreys (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
2008).
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coming to matter and ceasing to matter, which in turn relies on the
possibility ofmaterial properties changingwith scale.One could speak
here of a scale-dependent ontology, as some indeed do,23 but as long
as the multiple ontologies at different scales remain reducible to an
underlying ontology, the normative power of that ontology is bound
to remain irresistible.
While breaking with physics in favour of another, more properly
philosophical understanding of ontology is always an option, I argue
that the desired discontinuity can also be addressedmore immanently
within physics by considering the limit of infinitely small or infinitely
large scales and seeing how incompatible, discontinuously related fun-
damental ontologies can account for the same finite-scale properties.
In the next section, I will give some indications on how thinking with
physics in this manner may be helpful in devising strategies to de-
activate the normativity of fundamental ontologies, including those of
physics itself.
3. PROPOSITION: A PHYSICS OF EMERGENCE CAN HELP IN
DEACTIVATING ONTOLOGICAL NORMATIVITY
There is something to be learned, I suggest, from the ways in which
physics routinely combines and mixes incompatible, discontinuously
related ontologies whenmodelling phenomena emerging at some par-
ticular scale, such as the crystallization of liquids, the condensation
of vapour into droplets, or other so-called phase transitions. With the
phrase ‘mixing ontologies’ I mean describing matter both in terms of
discrete particles moving in a vacuum and in terms of continua of
energy, temperature, or some other fluid or field that can flow and
propagate waves.
In the late nineteenth century these ontological alternatives were
hotly debated and ultimately decided upon in favour of atomism.24
23 In addition to Woods, see, for instance, Robert W. Batterman, ‘Autonomy and Scales’,
inWhyMore Is Different: Philosophical Issues in CondensedMatter Physics and Complex
Systems, ed. by Brigitte Falkenburg and Margaret Morrison (Heidelberg: Springer,
2015), pp. 115–35 (p. 133).
24 Debates on atomism, which entangle metaphysics and physics, seem to keep recurring
on different time scales even after Immanuel Kant’s critical philosophy posits irresolv-
able antinomies of pure reason. See, for example, Alan Chalmers, ‘Atomism from the
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Nonetheless, continuummodels, which imply an ontology of continu-
ous, indefinitely divisible fluids rather than discrete atoms, are still
in use today and indeed continue to be omnipresent when physics
models emergent phenomena such as phase transitions. Of course, the
common view is that continuum descriptions are only pragmatic ap-
proximations and that continuum properties of matter emerge only in
a pragmatic sense at large scales, and are, in principle, reducible to the
properties of atoms and their interactions. However, it turns out that
simple everyday experiences such as the qualitative difference between
phases, the transitions between them, and other thermodynamic phe-
nomena are remarkably hard to grasp or even define without relying
on continuum descriptions.
In the late nineteenth century, statisticalmechanicswas developed
to make the reduction of everyday phenomena to an atomistic ontol-
ogy plausible and to understandhow the thermodynamic properties of
matter can emerge from mechanics. Perhaps the most important and
basic issue at stake here is the so-called second lawof thermodynamics,
the law of irreversibly increasing entropy, which has been interpreted
as defining an arrow of time. The challenge is that the laws of mech-
anics are reversible — any process going in one direction can also go
in the opposite direction — and it would seem logically impossible
to derive a directed process, such as a tendency towards equilibrium,
from reversible laws. Yet, statistical mechanics shows that if you have
enough particles there is an overwhelming probability that the com-
plicated and therefore effectively random movement of microscopic
particles will behave as described by thermodynamics and approach
equilibrium.
Most physicists are quite satisfied with such an account, which
considers all material processes to be reducible in principle but allows
for the emergence of new properties — such as irreversibility — in
17th to the 20th Century’, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Edward N.
Zalta (Spring 2019 Edition) <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/
atomism-modern/> [accessed 5 May 2020] and Torsten Wilholt, ‘When Realism
Made a Difference: The Constitution of Matter and Its Conceptual Enigmas in Late
19th Century Physics’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in
History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 39.1 (2008), pp. 1–16 <https://doi.org/10.
1016/j.shpsb.2007.04.003>. While physicists may no longer question the reality of
atoms, they have also ceased to consider them as elementary and tend rather towards
ontologies of continuous fields, strings, or membranes.
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practice. Such a pragmatic sense of emergence is sufficient to justify
the use of thermodynamics, andmore generally, the relative autonomy
of phenomena at higher levels and the respective disciplines studying
them, such as chemistry and biology.
However, others observe that this view of ‘reducible in principle,
but emergent in practice’ privileges fundamental physics and under-
mines other sciences and their objects. In other words, critics have
highlighted how a pragmatic sense of emergence introduces no discon-
tinuity or cut, and they worry that the fundamental ontology and its
laws continue to dominate everything across all scales.
I take this worry seriously. It corresponds, in effect, to what I
have called the normative performativity of ontology, which here takes
the form of extending reversibility from the fundamental level to all
scales and disregarding a pragmatic emergence of irreversibility.When
viewed from a certain perspective, such normativity is irresistible as
it seems logically impossible to shift continuously between opposite
properties.
In the final quarter of the last century, Ilya Prigogine and Isa-
belle Stengerswere particularly vocal in insisting that thermodynamics
should be taken more seriously than a pragmatic approximation of
particle mechanics. They argued that change is fundamentally im-
possible in an ontology of particles obeying deterministic, reversible
laws, and time is just an illusion, insofar as the past and future are, in
principle, fully determined by the present state.25 Within the paradigm
25 To be a little more precise, Prigogine and Stengers highlight in Order Out of Chaos:
Man’sNewDialogue withNature (London:Heinemann, 1984) that classicalmechanics
expresses a ‘static view of nature’ (p. 11). Seeing that mechanics is all about particles
moving in space and time, this claim is counter-intuitive, but their point is that with
laws of motion that are both deterministic and reversible, a system’s state at any given
moment fully determines all states in the future and the past. As Alvin Toffler writes in
his foreword, ‘there is no evolution, neither to order nor to disorder, the “information”
[…] remains constant in time’ (p. xxix). The problem with classical physics is, for
Prigogine and Stengers, therefore not that it implies or may inspire fatalism — though
it certainly does — but rather that it does not allow for any real sense of process,
transformation, or becoming. It means ultimately, as they say in reference to Einstein,
to ‘deny the reality of time as irreversibility, as evolution’ (p. 293). Such a sense of time
is enabled through irreversible laws of transformation, even if they remain determin-
istic and involve, for instance, a constant loss of information. In any case, Prigogine
and Stengers’s insistence on irreversibility through the second law of thermodynamics
seems only to further fatalism, which implies neither determinism nor reversibility,
but is consistent with the presence of randomness (on which Prigogine and Stengers
insist) and even free will. Indeed, the second law is usually associated with entropic
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of particle mechanics, everyday experiences of change, evolution, de-
cay, or anything else that could matter would only be due to our
subjective perception, our ignorance of the fundamental details, and
to the way we construct the world at our scale. Prigogine and Stengers
therefore stress the importance of finding an alternative ontology in
which irreversibility and randomness are fundamental. Even if their
context is different and their project more thorough, their insistence
on acknowledging the fundamental activity and creativity of mat-
ter, and their arguments about the far-reaching political and cultural
implications of a post-Newtonian ontology, are strikingly similar to
new-materialist arguments of this century.
Again, I am suspicious of the foundationalist gesture that insists
on the relevance of matter’s fundamental ontology and embraces its
performative normativity. As an alternative to either refraining from
ontology or developing a less damaging one, I propose to deactivate
the performative normativity of ontology by redoubling reduction,
that is, by showing how the same properties can, as a matter of prin-
ciple, be reduced to, and therefore also be considered to emerge
pragmatically from, radically different ontologies with conflicting per-
formative normativities. In other words, I propose, on the one hand, to
accept physics’ weak,merely pragmatic sense of emergence, embracing
it as the only thing mattering at any given scale; and, on the other
hand, I propose to deactivate the normativity conveyed by the claim
that emergent properties remain, in principle, reducible through a
strategic redoubling: if atoms could only become plausible by demon-
strating how observed properties can pragmatically emerge from them
at higher scales, then I maintain that, as a matter of principle, the same
properties can also emerge in the samepragmatic sense froma radically
different ontology of continuous matter.
processes inevitably leading to death, disorder, and decay, and ultimately with the so-
called ‘heat death of the universe’. However, if fatalism tends to focus on some future
event and its imperviousness to whatever happens before, and if standard thermo-
dynamics focuses on describing equilibrium states no matter how they are produced
by irreversible processes, the interim is all that matters to Prigogine. In The End of
Certainty: Time, Chaos and the New Laws of Nature (New York, NY: Free P, 1996),
he recalls the anecdote of a 1946 meeting, in which his interest in nonequilibrium
physics was received by a hostile comment that highlighted the transient character of
irreversible processes and for which he now would have the repartee: ‘But we are all
transient. Is it not natural to be interested in our common human condition?’ (p. 62).
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Without going into details, let me just highlight that this is not
to deny the reality of atoms, but to insist that one can always go to
smaller scales and establish well-defined procedures for re-describing
atoms as pragmatically emerging from continuum fields. Here discon-
tinuity is neither in emergence or scale but rather between the contrary
ontologies that one can posit speculatively, and the point is that this
discontinuity becomes increasingly irrelevant as the scale of the fun-
damental ontology decreases with respect to ours.
Of course, the very notion of a fundamental ontology becomes
problematic in this infinite regress to smaller scales, but whereas rela-
tional ontologies tend to invoke such a regress — often through the
image of ‘turtles all the way down’26 — in order to stress a lack of
foundation that renders everything unstable, my emphasis lies on the
emergence of a remarkable stability and consistency at higher scales.
Indeed, the higher scales — which is where matter comes to matter
— can be considered autonomous or ‘protected’ from lower scales.27
Conversely, the fundamental ontology becomes increasingly uncer-
tain because nothing can possibly be experienced that would allow
for a decision between different ontological options, and therefore
the fundamental ontology becomes utterly irrelevant. Rather than an
ontology of indeterminacy, I would prefer to speak of an utter inde-
terminacy of ontology; of an undecidability of ontology rather than an
ontology of undecidability.
Fundamental, so-called high-energy physics seems close to the
point of showing its own irrelevance, even if it is no doubt premature
to speculate over whether the Higgs Boson is the last evidence that
can be of some guidance or whether astronomical observations can
give some clues.More interesting and certainlymore relevant formost
of us is what emerges on intermediate scales, from condensed matter
physics to chemistry, biology, and geology (to speak only of the natural
sciences).
26 See Isabelle Stengers, ‘Turtles All the Way Down’, in Power and Invention: Situating
Science (Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, 1997); Donna J. Haraway,When
Species Meet (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), pp. 32–33 and 287.
27 Important references within physics for the kind of argument to which I am alluding
here are Philip W. Anderson, ‘More Is Different: Broken Symmetry and the Nature of
the Hierarchical Structure of Science’, Science, 177 (1972), pp. 393–96 and Robert B.
Laughlin and David Pines, ‘The Theory of Everything’, PNAS, 97.1 (2000), pp 28–31.
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If, as I am insisting, theontologies envisagedby fundamental phys-
ics are irrelevant at this scale, my argument that a particle ontology
can, in principle, always be re-described in terms of continua (and vice
versa) could seem equally irrelevant. My claim is certainly not one in
which thoseworking in statisticalmechanics, for instance,would be in-
terested, as it would only make the dynamics much more complicated
and unmanageable without having any practical advantages.28
Conceptually, however, the possibility of such a re-description
is significant insofar as large-scale properties, such as the irreversible
tendency towards equilibrium, can then be seen as a strict rather than
an approximate consequence of the fundamental ontology (which is,
as always, only ever posited speculatively). As a consequence, phys-
ics’ practice of combining descriptions corresponding to incompatible
ontologies appears in a different light. Indeed, I would like to point
out that the very theory that convinced physicists of the ‘reality of
atoms’ — Einstein’s theory of Brownian motion — crucially depends
just as much on an atomic description as on a continuum descrip-
tion.29 While there is an ingrained habit in physics of considering the
continuum as but a large-scale approximation of a more fundamental
atomic description,my argument on the double reducibility of all phe-
nomena makes it possible to take the continuum just as seriously and
consider atoms as but a way of approximating continuous matter.
I suggest that methodically oscillating between such contrary on-
tologies and combining them on an equal footing helps to deactivate
their normative power and to recognize scale-specific phenomena like
Brownian motion as mattering in their own right, that is, not just as
proof of atomismbut equally as proof of the reality of a continuum, and
ultimately also as something ‘more’ — namely, as something coming
28 Such pragmatic considerations — rather than an obstinate adherence to classical
physics— are themain reason that Prigogine’s ambitious project of establishing a ‘new
physics’ with an alternative fundamental description (appropriate for phenomena in
far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics) remains popular only outside of physics and
must be considered a failure within physics, as Stengers also ended up conceding.
See Isabelle Stengers, Cosmopolitics, 2 vols (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 2010–11), ii (2011), ‘Book v. In the Name of the Arrow of Time: Prigogine’s
Challenge’, pp. 103–204 (pp. 121–22).
29 Cf. Sergio Chibbaro, Lamberto Rondoni, and Angelo Vulpiani, Reductionism, Emer-
gence and Levels of Reality:The Importance of Being Borderline (Cham: Springer, 2014),
especially section ‘3.3 The Paradigmatic Brownian Motion’ (pp. 57–62).
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to matter at a specific scale, requiring physics to work through specific
combinations of mutually incompatible ontologies.30
CONCLUSION
To conclude, I have argued that the fundamental ontology of matter as
theorized by physics is irrelevant at human scales, but that it is polit-
ically relevant to address its performative power. I have suggested that
this power is due to a seemingly irresistible reductionist attitude that
sees in pragmatically emergent properties only the properties of the
underlying ontology and not their novel character. In order to deacti-
vate the misleading normativity of ontology, it seems insufficient to
highlight that the whole point of physics’ reductionist theorizing is to
understand how novel properties can emerge from a simple ontology;
nor is it effective to refrain from all ontological references or posit an
ontology of indeterminacy. Instead, the best political strategy may be
to insist on an indeterminacy of ontology, that is, to posit method-
ically and speculatively mutually incompatible ontologies and work
through their consequences in alternation or even conjunction. I sug-
gest that understanding and probing such a methodology in physics
may provide helpful models to think with in other domains, even if
the relevant ontological questions are quite different, involving not
particles and continua, but oppositions such as activity and passivity,
matter and language, nature and culture.
According to this view, physics can offer to critical thought not
a solid foundation of matter and the world, but rather tools for cri-
tique that seem to defy logic and challenge deeply ingrained habits
of thought. The political relevance of physics lies in not only showing
the irrelevance of its fundamental ontologies, but also in indicating
strategies to deactivate their normative ontologies and thereby open
spaces for political negotiations.
30 Alluding here to Harman’s critique of ‘duomining’, I suggest to take objects seriously
precisely insofar as their modelling within physics requires a double undermining
(which is effectively an undermining and an ‘overmining’). Cf. Graham Harman,
‘Stengers on Emergence’, BioSocieties, 9.1 (2014), pp. 99–104 <https://doi.org/10.
1057/biosoc.2013.43> and Graham Harman, ‘Agential and Speculative Realism: Re-
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